## NKRI, SKB and Radicalism

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On Tuesday (12/11), eleven ministers signed the issuance of a Joint Decree (SKB) related to the radicalism of the State Civil Apparatus (ASN), at the Grand Sahid Hotel, South Jakarta. The eleven ministers referred to were Menpan-RB Tjahjo Kumolo, Minister of Home Affairs Tito Karnavian, Menkumham Yasonna H. Laoly, Minister of Religion Fachrul Razi, Minister of Education and Culture Nadiem Makarim, Minister of Communication and Information Johnny G Plate, Head of BIN Budi Gunawan, Head of BNPT Suhardi Alius, Head of BKN Bima Haria Wibisana, Head of Ministry of Education and Culture Hariyono, and Chairman of the ASN Commission Agus Pramusinto.

Six decisions resulted in the development of a synergy to eradicate radicalism, the formation of a task force (Satgas), violation criteria, and sanctions. Every ASN allegedly infected with radicalism will be prosecuted by the Task Force. As a cooperative step, the Task Force has prepared a special website for complaints related to ASN radicalism, namely the <u>aduanasn.id</u> site. Hate speech against the State, SARA, or just share / repost / retweet, can be reported through the complaint site.

The pros and cons of comments were coming. House Speaker Puan Maharani said the SKB was a form of setback. He ensured that the SKB would be rejected by most members of the DPR, although discussions related to Commission II would continue. In line with Puan, human rights activist and founder of the Lokataru Foundation, Haris Azhar said, the SKB was like the legalization of critical ASN as a radical stance. He assumed, besides being curbed, ASN was being labeled. "This is like the 1965 era," he said.

It is important to note, there are, at least, eleven points regarding the criteria for complaints of ASN which are considered to be restraining, namely: 1) Tests of hatred against Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution, Unity in Diversity, NKRI, and the government verbally / in writing, 2) Speeches of SARA orally hatred / written, 3) Disseminating it (upload / share / retweet / repost) through social media, 4) Creating fake news (hoaxes), 5) Spreading hoaxes like the fourth point.

6) Conducting activities that insult Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution, Unity in Diversity, the Unitary Republic of Indonesia, and the government, 7) Participating in the sixth point activity, 8) Giving likes / retweeting / comments related to the sixth point, 9) Using attributes that conflict with Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution , Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, NKRI, and the government, 10) Direct / social media harassment of symbols, and 11) ASN consciously did points 1-10.

## **Seeds of Acute Radicalism**

Benah is an effort to eradicate, while the seed is a regeneration of radicalism, or the beginning of radicalism. Every step of deradicalization is always intertwined in both of them, so that the failure to reform radical nuances seems to be a patchwork activity. It is important to say, all the government's tactical aggressiveness in dealing with radicalism is a response to these fears. Lots of evidence that can be submitted.

The radical escalation of understanding, as well as how we measure our fears, cannot be measured only by the number of suicide bombings. Not. If so, how narrow are the benchmarks used, while the number of suicide tragedies is only a finger count. What can be used to find out about this escalation is especially the increasing opposition to Islamic moderation. Not a few people assume, for example, that those who are moderate are liberals.

So, there is a stigmatic view of the Islamic ideal. The consequence was that they were not affected by the Muhammadiyah and NU moderation projects, for example, and tended to choose organizations that were not moderate. That is the fundamental reason, why those who are exposed to radicalism prefer new and different things that seem to teach the purity of Islam. At this stage, the salafiwahabi ideology found its stage. That is the most important.

In addition, the escalation of radicalism has become acute as we can now see also through the decline of humanism, humanity. The suicide bombing included in it.

These two entrances to radicalism; the stigmatization of Islamic moderation or ideal Islam, and the guise of the purification of Islamic teachings, is a measure of how acute radicalism undermines this nation. Also, it is also an indicator of how much de-radicalization will succeed.

When it comes to whether the threat to the Republic of Indonesia is very large or not, the answer is relative. Judging from the percentage, adherents of radical ideology are still in the small category. However, from the tactical point of radicalization, this is certainly not unusual. We also need to worry, that the Republic of Indonesia is at its lowest point. That is why, responding to the SKB radicalism signed by eleven ministers requires an in-depth study. Restraining or not, amid acute radicalism, the policy cannot be criticized for granted.

## **Measuring the Effectiveness of SKB**

But is it true that the Joint Decree on ASN radicalism will reduce radicalism itself? The instant answer is: 'Yes, in the ASN circles. But for radicalism in general, the Joint Decree is not of much use. 'Maybe some circles disagree with the answer. But who can clearly describe it, compared to ordinary people, millennial for example, how significant is the number of ASNs? Need real statistics. Because, the percentage is important when measuring effectiveness.

That the Joint Decree for ASN is a concrete manifestation of the total war the government counter radicalism is something that cannot be denied. But that the policy tends to be reductive, due to the fact that ASN is not the only element that has a tendency to be infected with radical ideas, it is also true. Therefore, there is only one question that must be asked: after the ASN is completely sterile, will the millennial generation recover from its awakening?

That's where the orientation of radicalism is mapped. ASN is only a body, but radical ideology can be transformed into other bodies. Is not it worth to be taken into account, related to the possibility of affiliation to the other body. There was also the measure of the SKB's competitiveness raised. That it turns out, supervising ASN is mere supervision on the body. As an ideology, it is not impossible that radicalism will continue to spread beyond the control of the Task Force formed by the government.

Which can be viewed positively is, however, the SKB is a step to neutralize radicalism. At least in one element, namely ASN. How ASN has a large portion of

radical understanding will automatically be minimized. In any case, the castration of ASN's human rights on social media will also produce fear in the eyes of the public, outside of ASN itself. To some extent, de-radicalization will succeed, although the significance of that success cannot yet be known.

While the deradicalization through the Joint Decree was successful, not a few ASNs would be disappointed, because their privacy felt exploited by the government. We also need to worry here, isn't one of the factors of extreme actions such as suicide bomb terror is that disappointment? So basically, the SKB still contains positive and negative sides. To the extent that it is effective in deradicalizing it, to the same extent, disappointment many find momentum.

## From SKB to Self-Deradicalization

Some of them escaped the attention of the government, even in the midst of their incessant efforts to eradicate radicalism, namely the potential for self-deradicalization. This could be the most effective opportunity for deradicalization, by turning to the collective consciousness of those who have fallen prey to radicalism. However, concrete experience will give birth to the stability to act without anyone's deed, including the government. This is of course more effective than forced policies.

There are usually two main entrances to deradicalization; stem radicalism - the government policy inherent in it - and introduce Islamic moderation comprehensively. The ASN radicalism decree is classified as the first step, while the second step has not been touched, or touched but only in the basics. I was so untouched that opposition to moderation sounded louder than moderation itself. The proof, people are more familiar with the term "migrate" than the term "tasamuh".

Therefore, what must be prioritized is the teaching of Islamic moderation, long before an offensive-repressive policy is adopted. As a universal ideal-concept of diversity, moderation will become a platform that neutralizes radicalism, without the person feeling blocked by their rights. Introducing Islamic moderation must be through real practice, how we interpret tolerance, respond to diversity, and teach about how bad terror-radical acts are.

From the Joint Decree to self-deradicalization is a form of progressivity on the one hand, and optimization of deradicalization on the other. The Joint Decree was

made a sign not to act radically, while Islamic moderation was projected as a turning point for the escalation of radicalism. Through this continuity, self-deradicalization will become something very potential. This potential cannot be measured by mere presumption, but its effectiveness in deradicalization is indisputable.

The government no longer has to make repressive policies, and although it is not an instant case, de-radicalization will experience significant success. It is time for radicalism to be eradicated by itself, without anyone feeling castrated by their rights or being intimidated by their privacy. To realize all this, the cooperation of all parties; the people and government, must be maximally consolidated. Self-deradicalization is, again, not an easy matter. It must be compact and simultaneous, because radicalism is a common enemy.